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The Meaning of "Unfair" in
United States Import Policy
J. Michael Finger*
Unfair trade cases are where the action is. According to two
of Washington's top trade lawyers, these cases "have become the
usual first choice for industries seeking protection from imports
into the U.S."' There are indeed a lot of cases. From 1975 to
1979, the U.S. government processed 245 antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty (antisubsidy) cases, or around fifty cases a year.2
In the 1980s, the caseload rose even higher, to eighty-six cases a
year.3 By comparison, there have been only four escape clause
cases a year;4 cases in which an industry sought protection from
import competition without accusing the foreign seller of em-
ploying or benefiting from unfair practices.5
Several features stand out from the pattern of U.S. an-
tidumping and countervailing duty cases from 1980 through 1988
(see Tables 1 and 2):6
U The number of antidumping and countervailing duty cases
* J. Michael Finger is Lead Economist, Trade Policy, at the World Bank.
University of Texas, B.A.; University of North Carolina, Ph.D. The author
wishes to thank Gary N. Horlick and Robert E. Hudec for their thoughtful com-
ments on an earlier version, and Ms. Nellie T. Artis for administrative and edi-
torial assistance that has been invaluable. But the author alone is responsible
for opinions and interpretations expressed here, and for remaining errors.
1. Gary N. Horlick & Geoffrey D. Oliver, Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Law Provisions for the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 5 (1989).
2. J.M. Finger et al., The Political Economy of Administered Protection.
72 AM. ECON. REV. 452, 463 (1982) (Table 4).
3. Table 1.
4. N. David Palmeter, The Antidumping Emperor, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 5,
5 (1988).
5. The United States is not alone. Since 1980, the three other major users
of GATT-based import screens - Australia, Canada, and the European Com-
munity (EC) - have processed over a thousand antidumping and counter-
vailing duty cases, but only seventeen escape clause cases. J. MICHAEL FINGER,
ANTIDUMPING: How IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HuRT, Table 1.1 (forthcoming
Oct. 1992 from U. Michigan Press).
6. The data for Tables 1 and 2 are from J. Michael Finger & Tracy Mur-
ray, Policing Unfair Imports: The United States Example, 24 J. WORLD TRADE
39, 43, 45 (1990).
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directed at developed and developing countries is roughly pro-
portional to their exports to the United States.7 Within these
groups, however, there are large differences.
TABLE 1
U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty cases and U.S. merchandise import
shares, by country or trading bloc, 1980-88.
Cases as a Percentage Percentage
percentage 1987 U.S. cases with
Number of of total merchandise restrictive
Country or Group cases' cases imports outcomesb
All countries 774 100 100 70
Developed countries 450 58 63 65
Developing countries 286 37 36 75
Eastern European countries 38 5 0.5 87
European Community 304 40 20 64
Brazil 56 7 2 79
South Africa 20 2.6 0.3 100
Korea 36 4.7 4.2 86
Mexico 35 4.5 4.9 91
Taiwan, China 29 3.7 6.1 62
Hong Kong 1 0.1 2.4 100
Singapore 6 0.8 1.5 67
Canada 35 5 18 54
Japan 49 6 21 69
' Antidumping and countervailing duty cases completed during 1980-88.
b Negotiated export restraints are counted as restrictive outcomes.
Japan and the EC each supply about 20% of U.S. imports,
but the EC has been the object of 40% of U.S. antidumping and
countervailing duty cases, while Japan has been the object of
only 6%.8 Among developing countries, imports from Brazil
generate a disproportionately high number of cases, and imports
from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, a disproportionately
low number.9
0 Negotiated export restraints have superseded almost half
the cases (348 of 774). 10
E Three-fourths of the cases against developing countries re-
sulted in restrictive outcomes while only two-thirds of cases
against developed countries produced restrictive outcomes.'1
7. Table 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Table 2.
11. Id Cases categorized as having restrictive outcomes include those that
reached an affirmative final determination and those that were superseded by a
restrictive agreement with the exporter.
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Negotiated export restraints, however, were much more often
used against developed countries - the outcome in 36% of cases
compared with 15% for developing countries.12 A country that
possesses the countervailing power to retaliate is accorded the
courtesy of a negotiated settlement. Others are restricted to the
normal course of administrative procedures.
TABLE 2
Antidumping and countervailing duty case outcomes compared, 1980-88.
Negotiated export
Antidumping as Restrictive outcomes restraints as
Country or a percentage of as a percentage a percentage
Group total number of total cases of restrictive outcomes
Anti- Counter- Anti- Counter-
dumping vailing Both dumping vailing Both
All countries 50 72 67 70 63 66 64
Developed
countries 49 69 61 65 65 82 74
Developing
countries 46 73 77 75 55 46 49
Eastern European
countries 87 91 60 87 77 100 78
E The U.S. government almost always finds that the foreign
exporter is unfair or is benefiting from the unfair actions of its
government. Only 11% of dumping and subsidy determinations
result in negative determinations.' 3
N Finally, when the United States does not take action
against the accused exporter, more than six times in seven it is
because no competing U.S. producer has been harmed. Based on
percentages of affirmative and negative determinations at each
stage (preliminary injury, preliminary dumping or subsidy, final
dumping or subsidy, and final injury) over the 1980-88 period, a
"typical" one hundred cases that go through the process to a
formal ending will produce the following outcomes: forty-four
affirmative determinations (affirmative final determinations on
12. Id.
13. Finger & Murray, supra note 6, at 46 (Table 5). This figure can be
derived in two ways. If withdrawn cases or terminated proceedings are not
considered, but instead only those cases that resulted in formal determinations
are considered, there were 11.0% negative and 89.0% affirmative
determinations. If, on the other hand, cases withdrawn or terminated by the
Commerce Department are added to the cases having formal "negative"
determinations and cases that resulted in successful negotiation of a restrictive
agreement are added to the cases having formal "affirmative" determinations,
the split is then 11.5%, 88.5%. Id.
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injury and on dumping-subsidy), and fifty-six negative
determinations. Of the fifty-six cases that end with a negative
determination, eight will end with a negative dumping or
subsidy determination, forty-eight with a negative injury
determination.14
This Article examines the patterns of unfair trade cases in
the United States and how these patterns fit into or are shaped
by the politics of U.S. trade policy. It argues that an objective
definition of "unfair" neither is nor ever has been the basis for
determining when the U.S. government will act against imports.
The unfair trade laws provide the political rhetoric for
restricting imports, and the unfair trade procedures provide the
podium from which an import-competing U.S. firm or industry
can take its case to the public. However, injury to domestic
producers drives U.S. trade politics, and the mark an instance of
import competition receives on the political barometer of injury
determines when the power of the state will be used against
imports. Current U.S. import policy is a matter of pasting the
label "unfair" on a bottle that was filled from the spring of
domestic politics. It is not a matter of putting into the bottle
only what a studied prescription demands.
I. DID ANYBODY EVER CARE IF FOREIGNERS
ARE FAIR?
Suppose a car mechanic examines your car and concludes
that it will not run because the spark plug gaps are too wide. He
adjusts the spark plug gaps to the proper setting. Will your car
run now? It will if his diagnosis was correct; it will not if his
diagnosis was wrong.
Suppose the government examines your business and con-
cludes that you are losing money because your competitors are
pricing unfairly. The government orders them to set higher
prices. Will your business now improve? It very likely will, but
that improvement will not depend on whether the government's
diagnosis was correct. Regardless of whether your competitors
are pricing fairly or unfairly in some legal or philosophical
sense, simply forcing them to set higher prices will improve your
business. Thus, your interests lie in creating a broad and encom-
passing definition of what will cause, the government to act in
your favor, not a definition in accord with an abstract concept
14. Id. at 47.
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that may have an indirect bearing on the economic and financial
health of your business.
Any business beset by import competition will attempt to
explain its circumstances as those that the law can remedy and,
when the occasion presents itself, will attempt to change the law
so that it offers a remedy for its particular circumstances. 15 The
role of the law is to extract legitimate claims from this universe
of requests for import restrictions. This role suggests a public
goal different in some cases from the private goal;16 only when
the two are in accord would public means be used to satisfy the
private motive.
The public motive that built U.S. trade policy after World
War II was not fueled by the economic factors that motivate pri-
vate requests for import restrictions. The U.S. leadership con-
sidered freedom of commerce an important instrument for
building international stability and maintaining world peace.17
To Cordell Hull, Secretary of State for President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the link was straightforward: "unhampered trade
dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair
economic competition, with war."' 8 The Cold War allowed a
vulgar version of this idea to generate wide public support for
the government's trade policy - if the United States did not
provide markets for these countries, they would be taken over
by the communist bloc.
Within this strategy, trade remedies provided protection for
Congress against the wrath of special interests that pressured
members of Congress sympathetic to the general thrust of U.S.
trade policy.19 The 1950s and 1960s were generally prosperous
times during which the United States enjoyed substantial trade
surpluses. Directing a protection-seeking industry into a maze
15. It is, of course, neither illegal nor immoral to act from such motives.
Congress decides what the law will be, and every person has a right to attempt
to influence Congress' decision. The administering agencies, instructed by the
law and overseen by the courts, decide which petitions do in fact meet the crite-
ria established by the law. Any person may attempt to show that his or her
circumstances fit the prerequisites for the remedy that the law provides. Hon-
est enforcement of a policy, however, does not guarantee it will be a good policy.
16. I do not suggest that the public motive is "higher" on some moral scale
than private motives. This Article addresses requests that will be honored, not
those that should be honored.
17. R.N. Cooper, Trade Policy as Foreign Policy, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN
A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 291, 300 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1987).
18. CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HuLL 81 (1948).
19. I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS 12-
13 (1986).
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of administrative procedures bought time. By the time the in-
dustry eventually emerged from the end of the maze without a
prize, business had improved and it pressed its case no further.
Besides, the system satisfied the American sense of fairness. It
provided a place to complain where officials listened, investi-
gated, and held hearings. One had one's day in court. To com-
plain further would be un-American, and maybe even pro-
communist if the closing of the U.S. market tipped a country
over to the Soviet side in the Cold War.
On trade issues, two objectives came into play. One, which I
characterize as "internationalist," was to restore global stability
and to preserve world peace. The other, which I characterize as
"protectionist," was to preserve American profits and jobs in im-
port competing industries. And, as the above quote from Cordell
Hull dramatizes,2° on trade issues the two objectives were in di-
rect conflict. While internationalists wanted lower U.S. trade
barriers,21 protectionists sought to bolster them. But neither
side - not the "profits and jobs and save our communities"
calculus of import competing industries nor the "restore global
stability and preserve world peace" calculus of the international-
ists - had a direct interest in seeing that the term "fair" was
defined in some moral, economic, or otherwise objective sense.
For each, such a standard would limit rather than complement
its primary objective.
As for trade policy, the conflict between the two objectives
was more versus fewer trade restrictions, and those who favored
fewer carried the day. They won by emphasizing export poli-
tics2 2 and playing on the citizenry's sympathy for their strategic
and diplomatic concerns. They left the "fair versus unfair" issue
aside by making the trade negotiations the major thrust of U.S.
trade policy, not by demonstrating that everything exporters did
was fair. The politics of the day allowed the government to cali-
brate trade remedy law to produce trade restrictions at a slower
pace than the trade agreements removed them.
In the 1980s, the issue was still more versus fewer trade re-
strictions. Fairness continued to be the rhetoric of the matter,
but not the substance. Instead, injury has been the focus of U.S.
trade remedy law. However, determining gradations that distin-
20. See text accompanying note 18.
21. Stephen D. Krasner, U.S. Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unrav-
eling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness, 31 INT'L ORG.
635 (1977).
22. DESTLER, supra note 19, provides the best discussion of export politics.
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guish an affirmative injury determination from a negative one,
such as the difference between "serious injury" and "material
injury," have been so difficult to define that the results tend to
be arbitrary.23
II. FREE TRADE, NOT PROTECTION, DEPENDS ON
LOOPHOLES
The American obsession with regulation through formal-
ized rules combined with economists' abhorrence of import re-
strictions fuel the belief that those seeking import restrictions
must be winning by deceit and trickery, cynically exploiting
loopholes in the law and pressing vulnerable members of Con-
gress to insert new ones. But two related arguments suggest
that this is not true:
0 In the past, the executive branch depended on loopholes
and convenient details to control trade remedies, and
0 Congress has expanded the trade power and the scope of
trade remedies primarily by eliminating the details on which the
executive branch used to depend.
The loopholes on which the executive branch depended to
keep trade remedies under control were not subtle. Before 1974,
there was no time limit for completing a countervailing duty in-
vestigation. The Treasury Department24 often used this loop-
hole, defeating complaints against alleged foreign subsidies by
choosing not to complete an investigation. This loophole has not
been available since 1974 because Congress imposed deadlines on
countervailing duty cases.2 Also, in 1980 the ITC determined
there to be "no injury" in an escape-clause petition filed by the
23. For example, the Antidumping Authority Act of 1988 required the Aus-
tralian Antidumping Authority to investigate how "material injury" could be
defined in practice. ANTIDUMPING AUTHORITY, ADA PUB. No. 4, INQUIRY INTO
MATERIAL INJURY, PROFrr IN NORMAL VALUES AND EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME
27 (Australian Gov't Pub. Serv., Mar. 1989). Some submissions to the Authority
argued that even the slightest injury should be taken to be material, others said
that material injury should mean that the Australian industry was at the point
of extinction. Id. The Authority, however, could find no operational guidelines
to separate one degree of injury from another, and in the end recommended
that "material injury" be taken to mean injury which is "not immaterial, insub-
stantial or insignificant." Id. (emphasis added).
24. At that time, the Treasury Department was the administering agency.
Gary N. Horlick, THE UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING SYSTEM, in ANTIDUMPING
LAW AND PRACTICE 99, 105 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
25. Robert E. Baldwin & Michael 0. Moore, Political Aspects of the Admin-
istration of the Trade Remedy Laws, in DOwN IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION
OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAws 253, 256-57 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan
eds., 1991).
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automobile industry.2 6 Commissioners who voted against injury
did so not because the industry had not lost any money and jobs
to import competition, but because a recession and a shift of con-
sumer tastes away from larger cars had caused a greater loss of
money and jobs.27 This loophole was closed by the 1988 trade
bill. As the law was revised, the International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC) "may not aggregate the causes of declining demand
associated with a recession or economic downturn in the United
States economy into a single cause of serious injury .... ,,28
The same argument applies for "cumulation."29 If a domes-
tic industry is beset by competition from fifty different coun-
tries, it may be difficult to show that the domestic industry is
seriously injured by imports from any one of them. Yet com-
bined imports from the fifty might have a significant effect.
Prior to the trade bill of 1984, the ITC had discretion to consider
cumulated imports, but sometimes did not. The 1984 Act, at the
behest of domestic textile and steel companies, made cumulation
mandatory.3° The 1988 trade bill restored to the ITC the author-
ity to eliminate minimal suppliers at the preliminary stage.
However, the legislative history of the bill makes clear that Con-
gress expects the ITC to "apply the exception narrowly and [not
use it] to subvert the purpose and general application of the [cu-
mulation] requirement. '31
By closing loopholes that allowed negative determinations,
legislative modification and court review have pushed the mean-
ings of "subsidy," "dumping," and "injury" toward their mean-
ings in common usage. Cumulation of injury illustrates the
point. Would it be reasonable to grant relief to an industry that
was losing its U.S. market to a vigorous Korean industry, yet
deny it to an industry that was being nibbled to death by fifty
competitors? Consider downstream dumping. If the Canadian
26. Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor, De-
termination of No Serious Injury Thereof, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,194 (1980) (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm.).
27. See Gordon I. Endow, Recent Development, Car Wars: Auto Imports
and the Escape Cause, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 591, 603 (1981).
28. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 1401(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1228 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(2)(A) (1988)).
29. For a discussion of how cumulation serves protectionist interests, see
infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
30. Horlick & Oliver, supra note 1, at 35. The Court of International Trade
later ruled that the 1984 act requires cumulation across antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty cases. Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 627 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
31. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 621 (1988).
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government subsidizes the production of logs or sells them to
Canadian mills at one-tenth of their market value, it also subsi-
dizes or dumps the lumber. Therefore, protecting U.S. lumber
mills from Canadian competition seems reasonable. If the basic
concept of the law is implemented "reasonably," the result is in-
creased protection.
III. POWER POLITICS
Not all of the expansion of unfair trade law has been a mat-
ter of filling in loopholes. Some of it has been straightforward
power politics. 3 2 For example, Senator Russell B. Long of Loui-
siana3 3 successfully sponsored an amendment to the 1974 trade
bill to rescue a local sulfur producer in that state whose an-
tidumping petition had been turned down under existing law.s 4
Long's amendment required investigators to screen their obser-
vations of the exporter's home market price against their esti-
mate of the exporter's fully-allocated production costsss
Under this provision, even if export and home market prices
are identical, the exporter violates U.S. dumping law if the cost
estimated for the product by the Commerce Department ex-
ceeds the price charged. Generally, when the Commerce De-
partment finds that "below cost" sales are more than 10% of
home market transactions (by volume), it will base its dumping
calculations on the remaining "above cost" sales. When more
than 90% of home market transactions are at "below cost"
prices, all information on home market prices is discarded. For-
eign market value is then based on the Commerce Department's
estimate of the exporter's costs.3 6
In short, this provision requires the U.S. government to sys-
32. See generally Pietro S. Nivola, Trade Policy: Refereeing the Playing
Field, in A QUESTION OF BALANCE: THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND FOR-
EIGN POLICY 201-53 (Thomas E. Mann, ed. 1990) (providing examples of how
constituent pressures have expanded U.S. unfair trade laws).
33. Senator Long, as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, probably
had more power over trade legislation than any other member of Congress.
34. Nivola, supra note 32, at 229-30.
35. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (1988) (amended version of the Tariff Act of 1930
§ 773(b)).
36. See Harvey M. Applebaum & David R. Grace, US. Antitrust Law and
Antidumping Actions Under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 56
ANTITRUST L.J. 497 (1987). Along these lines another commentator adds that a
50% benchmark is sometimes used in cases involving fresh agricultural prod-
ucts. N. David Palmeter, The Antidumping Law: A Legal and Administrative
Nontariff Barrier, in DOwN IN THE DuMps: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR
TRADE LAws, 64, 74 n.26, 85 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
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tematically throw out the price information that is most
favorable to the exporter's case.3 7 Thus, foreigners (exporters)
whose prices in the U.S. market are below fully-allocated costs
are dumping and will be restrained, even though such pricing is
common practice in competitive markets and domestic firms
that follow the same pricing strategy are not in violation of U.S.
antitrust laws.
IV. CONGRESS INTENDS THE LAW TO PROTECT
Intent is important. Because Congress cannot anticipate the
details of every potential case, antidumping and countervailing
duty laws must provide administrative agencies with somewhat
general instructions. 38 Therefore, legal remedies primarily de-
pend on administrators' understanding of the laws' objectives.
Congress probably revealed implicit support for fewer trade
restrictions when it winked at the loopholes that allowed the ex-
ecutive branch to maintain the openness of the U.S. economy.
However, Congress has since vigorously moved to close those
loopholes, signaling that the antidumping and countervailing
duty procedures should not overlook any import competition
that injures a U.S. interest. The low standard of proof required
for an affirmative preliminary injury determination confirms
that Congress favors the domestic petitioner. Congress does not
presume that the U.S. market should be open to international
competition.
While trade bills are celebrated for the authority they give
the president to negotiate tariff reductions, expansion of the cir-
cumstances under which imports can be restricted has been a
quiet part of many of them. Through a sequence of changes
Congress has reduced the president's discretionary authority to
refuse to impose import restrictions when the International
Trade Commission makes affirmative decisions in escape clause
cases.39 Various drafts of the 1988 trade law contained provi-
sions in seemingly generic language which entitled the titanium,
ammonia, cement, and aircraft industries to antidumping and
countervailing duty protection.40 Not every such proposal earns
37. Horlick, supra note 24, at 137. Horlick reports that this provision has
been applied in sixty percent of investigations performed in the 1980s. Id. at
136.
38. "General" laws may nonetheless dictate the factors which will influ-
ence their administration. This matter is taken up later in this Article.
39. See generally ROBERT E. BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S.
IMPORT POLICY 33-78 (1985).
40. Gary C. Hufbauer, Comments on 'Protectionist Rules and Internation-
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legal enactment, but many of them do. Thus, protection of do-
mestic industry has expanded gradually, but considerably.
V. CONGRESS DOES NOT INTEND TO POLITICIZE
Those who consider rules and free trade "good" tend to as-
sociate '%ad" results with politics: if trade policy is deteriorat-
ing, it must be because politics has been allowed to creep in.
Again, preconceptions can be misleading. While Congress is
clearly moving to expand the availability of import relief, Con-
gress is not moving to loosen the criteria for import relief so that
administrators' determinations can bend with the political
breezes blowing that day. The text of the law has grown longer
and more detailed, and the administrative regulations have be-
come thicker. Perhaps the strongest indication that Congress
does not want to politicize the administration of trade law is that
it has made that administration subject to judicial review.4 1 Ju-
dicial review helps to provide predictable outcomes based on sys-
tematic interpretations of the legal criteria.
Shortly after administrative authority shifted from the
Treasury Department to the Commerce Department, critics in
Washington argued that the Commerce Department had, in a
matter of months, overthrown sixty years of consistent enforce-
ment of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. These
accusations were probably valid: Congress probably intended
changes in enforcement practice. The Treasury Department's
tradition of enforcement had evolved during a period of time
when international considerations and the public interest were
supposed to be taken into account. By 1980, however, Congress
wanted to break away from this mold. A total break with the
past, however, was not intended: throwing out sixty years of
consistent enforcement does not necessarily mean replacing it
with haphazard enforcement. Congress wanted a different
mold, not no mold at all.
The thrust of the enforcement and judicial traditions in the
United States is toward a consistent and systematic practice.
This does not mean that each individual will interpret the law in
the same way. In a study of injury determinations in antidump-
ing cases adjudicated between 1980 and 1986, Michael Moore
found that the percentage of affirmative votes for each of the
alist Discretion in the Making of National Trade Policy', in NEW INSTITU-
TIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY (Hans-Jurgen Vosgerau ed.,
1989).
41. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(e)-(f) (1988).
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twelve people serving on the International Trade Commission
ranged from 21% to 100%. 42 Yet, when Moore analyzed the fac-
tors on which the decisions were based, he found that each com-
missioner systematically based his or her decision on the factors
that the law identifies with injury and that factors not specified
in the law had minimal influence.4 He found that each individ-
ual assigned different weights to the various factors, but that
each systematically applied these weighted factors to the re-
viewed cases.
However, this tendency to systematize the interpretation of
the law and to make it objective is not a limit on the frequency
of restrictive actions. Every new dimension of unfairness allows
interest groups to argue for a new import restriction and allows
Congress eventually to add to the law a new, more restrictive
interpretation of that dimension. "For every unfair practice that
is attacked, several new ones pop up, summoning amendments
as the definition of unfairness expands."44
VI. THE PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS OF UNFAIR TRADE
The failure of the "protectionist" message in the presiden-
tial campaigns of Walter Mondale, John Connolly, and Richard
Gephardt is evidence that blatant protectionism is still a loser in
U.S. politics. The regulation of unfair foreign trade practices,
however, is surely a political winner. The rhetoric of unfair
trade provides the president the same opportunity it provides
the Congress - to have one's cake and eat it too.45 The presi-
dent can collect his political rewards and honor his political com-
mitments by enforcing the law and by negotiating voluntary
export restraints.
For example, in response to a growing number of congres-
sional initiatives on trade policy, President Reagan took a giant
step toward re-establishing the Executive's leadership by an-
nouncing a two-pronged policy plan in a speech given on Sep-
tember 23, 1987: to work with the leadership of other countries
to lower the value of the dollar and to aggressively attack for-
42. See generally Michael E. Moore, Rules or Politics? An Empirical Anal-
ysis of International Trade Commission Antidumping Decisions, 30 ECON. IN-
QUIRY (forthcoming, 1992).
43. Id. A similar analysis in dumping and subsidy determinations likewise
found that influences not expressed in the law did not effect the determina-
tions. Finger et al., supra note 2, at 452.
44. Nivola, supra note 32, at 247.
45. Id. at 223-24 (arguing that the rhetoric of unfair trade provides an effec-
tive means to avoid blame for the executive branch and for Congress).
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eign unfair trade practices. The first draft of the trade speech
was a free trade speech; the draft he delivered was a fair trade
speech. Officials in the White House did not make the change
for any principled legal or economic reason, but rather because
the officials considered fair trade rhetoric more politically sali-
ent than free trade rhetoric.A
While this fair trade speech marked a significant shift in
President Reagan's rhetoric on the matter, it did not mark his
administration's discovery of unfair trade politics. Two weeks
before, in defending the administration's international economic
policy, Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III pointed out, "We
have not neglected our responsibilities to fair trade .... Presi-
dent Reagan, in fact, has granted more import relief to U.S. in-
dustry than any of his predecessors in more than half a
century. '47 Half a century covers every president since Herbert
Hoover, the president who signed the Smoot-Hawley tariff.
VII. THE GATT DOES NOT RESTRICT TRADE ACTIONS
John H. Jackson expressed a long-standing concern of the
Contracting Parties to the GATT as follows: "[The mere initia-
tion of a dumping procedure... is often so costly to the importer
that [the initiation], on the threat of such procedure, inhibits im-
ports even if the procedure ultimately establishes that no dump-
ing occurred..."4 Jackson quotes a 1959 GATT Working Group
on the intent of the GATT: "[I]t was essential that countries
should avoid immoderate use of anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duties, since this would reduce the value of the efforts
that had been made since the war to remove barriers to trade."49
The GATT, however, has proven to be a minimal limit to
the expanding use of unfair trade laws. Firstly, because the
GATT's language on what is permissible is very broad, the ex-
plosion of cases in the 1980s has triggered only a handful of ap-
46. A perceptive Wall Street Journal story documents the transformation
that took place from first draft to last: "One business lobbyist called to say
'free-trade rhetoric is a loser politically; fair-trade rhetoric is a winner.'" Rob-
ert W. Merry, Reagan's Aides Split over His Trade Speech and Altered It
Sharply, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1985, at A12. White House Chief of Staff Don
Regan met with a group of outside advisers, including long time Reagan strate-
gists Stuart Spencer and Lyn Nofziger, who echoed that view. Id.
47. James A. Baker III, Remarks before a Conference Sponsored by the
Institute for International Economics (Sept. 14, 1987), in TREASURY NEWS, 1988,
at 4.
48. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 407 (1969).
49. Id. at 409.
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peals to the GATT. Moreover, countries against which GATT
panels have ruled continue to rely on their own interpretations
of GATT provisions.
The United States is the only country that makes extensive
use of countervailing duties to control imports.5° Though such
U.S. actions often raise the ire of exporting countries, that ire
has usually been political rather than legal.51 India, in 1980, was
the first country to ask for a GATT panel on a U.S. counter-
vailing duty action. After the United States and India reached a
satisfactory bilateral resolution, India requested that the panel
be terminated.5 2 Five other countervailing actions by the United
States have been taken to GATT panels. Three of the actions
are very recent and panel investigations are still under way. The
panel report from one of the other two cases has not (yet) been
adopted.53
50. Of some 370 countervailing duty investigations by industrial countries
in the 1980s, 316 were initiated by the United States. Finger, supra note 5, at
Table 1.1.
51. J. Michael Finger & Julio Nogues, International Control of Subsidies
and Countervailing Duties, 1 WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 707-25 (1987).
52. United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duty without Injury
Criterion, BISD 28th Supp. 113 at 5 (1982) (GATT panel report adopted Nov.
3, 1981). Horlick and Oliver describe the outcome as a "soft deal," in which the
United States agreed to include India among the countries for which the U.S.
countervailing duty procedure would include an injury test, in exchange for soft
discipline on Indian export subsidies. Horlick & Oliver, supra note 1, at 12.
53. Panels appointed by the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures are presently investigating the following matters: Countervailing
measures on salmon from Norway (GATT Doc. SCM/M/57), Measures affecting
the export of pure and alloy magnesium from Canada (GATT Docs. SCM/130
and SCM/M/57), and Measures affecting the export of softwood lumber from
Canada (GATT Docs. SCM/133 and SCM/M/57). The U.S.-Canada dispute over
softwood lumber was reopened when Canada terminated a bilateral memoran-
dum of understanding that had ended an earlier dispute, the earlier dispute
having also gone to a GAIT panel. United States - Initiation of a CVD Inves-
tigation into Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, BISD 34th Supp. 194
(1988) (Subsidies Code panel report adopted June 3,1987, providing terms of the
memorandum of understanding). In 1988, Brazil requested a panel (under the
Subsidies Code) to investigate U.S. failure to automatically backdate the revoca-
tion of a countervailing duty order on Brazilian exports of non-rubber footwear.
When this panel did not find in Brazil's favor, United States - Countervailing
Duties on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil, GATT Doc. SCM/94 (Oct. 4,1989)
(Subsidies Code panel report), Brazil brought the matter to the GATT Council,
and a panel appointed by the Council found in Brazil's favor. United States -
Denial of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwear from
Brazil, GATTf Doc. DS/18/R (Jan. 10, 1992) (GATT panel report). As of June
1992, neither panel report on non-rubber footwear had been adopted. The other
U.S. countervailing action taken to a GATT panel (under the Subsidies Code)
involved an EC complaint concerning wine and grape products. A panel report
delivered in 1986 was finally adopted on April 28, 1992. United States - Defini-
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The first GATT case against a U.S. antidumping action was
filed by Sweden in 1988. In August 1990, the GATT panel that
investigated the case returned a finding in favor of Sweden,54
but as of this writing (October 1992) the United States has not
allowed the panel's report to be adopted.55 A few months ear-
lier, a GATT panel that looked into a Japanese complaint about
an EC antidumping action found against the European Commu-
nity,56 and the panel's report was adopted by the GATT Council.
The European Community has announced, however, that it will
neither lift the action that was contested nor change its an-
tidumping policy, pending the outcome of the Uruguay Round
negotiations.57
tion of Industry Concerning Wine and Grape Products, GATI' Doc. SCM/71
(Mar. 24, 1986) (Subsidies Code panel report).
54. United States - Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Imports of
Stainless Seamless Steel Hollow Products from Sweden, GATT Doc. ADP/47
(Aug. 20, 1990) (Antidumping Code panel report).
55. The panel chose not to consider the substance of the Swedish com-
plaint, instead basing its finding on a procedural technicality - that in the U.S.
antidumping proceeding, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) did
not determine at the appropriate stage of its proceedings that the petitioner was
representative of the U.S. industry. Id., 5.18-19. If the ITC chose to treat this
finding as it would a remand from the U.S. Court of International Trade, it
could go through its proceedings in the sequence the panel considers proper and
shortly return the same affirmative injury finding.
The ITC, in the original case, had determined that Swedish welded stain-
less steel tubes caused no injury to the U.S. welded stainless tubes industry, but
that Swedish seamless stainless steel tubes did cause injury. Reg. 45,265 (1987).
The action Sweden brought to GATT concerned the antidumping measure im-
posed on seamless tubes as a result of the "seamless half" of the ITC case. USA
- Anti-dumping Duty in the United States on Stainless Seamless Pipes and
Tubes from Sweden, ADP/40, (Jan. 4, 1989) (communication from Sweden).
Meanwhile, the petitioner appealed the welded tubes determination to the U.S.
Court of International Trade. That court remanded the case to the ITC for re-
consideration. Trent Tube Div., Crucible Materials Corp. v. United States, 741
F. Supp. 227 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), modified, 741 F. Supp. 921 (1990). On re-
mand, the ITC determined that the petitioner was in fact injured by the Swed-
ish welded tubes. Trent Tube Div., Crucible Materials Corp. v. United States,
752 F. Supp. 468. Thus, while Sweden has attempted - so far unsuccessfully -
to enlist the GATT's help to remove the U.S. antidumping order on seamless
tubes, the U.S. government reversed itself on the other half of the case and
imposed antidumping duties on welded tubes. 55 Fed. Reg. 51,745 (1990). See J.
Michael Finger, Bad Law Begets Embarrassing Diplomacy: An Example of
How U.S. Trade Law Really Works, ECONOMIsK DEBA77r (forthcoming) (provid-
ing a detailed analysis of this case).
56. European Economic Community - Regulation on Imports of Parts
and Components, BISD 37th Supp. 132 (1991) (GATT panel report adopted May
16, 1990), reprinted in 30 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1081 (1991).
57. EEC Comments on the Panel Report on EEC - Regulation on Imports
of Parts and Components, GATT Doc. L/6676 (May 16, 1990).
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More than 170 pages of proposals have been submitted at
the Uruguay Round to modify the antidumping code. The pro-
posals are almost evenly split between expanding and limiting
the circumstances which allow an antidumping action.ms Mean-
while, the permissive U.S. and EC interpretations of GATT have
been used as ammunition against reform in Australia and Can-
ada.59 As the Uruguay Round moves toward final agreement,
GATT's broad language will not significantly inhibit the increas-
ing use of antidumping and countervailing duty regulations.
Even where there are clear limits in GATT, they do not nec-
essarily restrict the U.S. government from acting against im-
ports. Sometimes GATT's restrictions do not carry over into
U.S. law. Robert Hudec sums up the relation between GATT
and U.S. trade law in these words:
The general structure of U.S. foreign trade law exhibits a reasonable
degree of consistency with the main policy lines set down in GATT....
In a number of these laws, the Congress has provided as much or more
substantive detail as the GATT itself contains.... At the other ex-
treme, the number of laws openly violating GATT remain reasonably
few. The main body of US. trade law occupies a middle position be-
tween these extremes of compliance and direct violation, a middle posi-
tion in which the Executive has discretionary power which allows him
to comply with GATT or not, according to policy decisions that are
largely unreviewable .... Wherever U.S. foreign trade law takes this
discretionary middle position, there is in fact no meaningful legal re-
quirement that GAT rules be observed. There may, of course, be a
reasonable level of GATT compliance in fact, but if so, it is a matter of
day-to-day Executive policy, and not law.
6 °
Even when there are limits in U.S. unfair trade law, these
limits do not prevent the government from restricting imports
politically perceived as unfair. I turn again to Hudec:
Trade barriers are fungible, and they overlap. Legal controls on one
type of trade barrier, like an escape clause, will not be fully effective if
those seeking protection can achieve the escape clause result by other
means that are not controlled.... A classic example occurred in late
1983 when certain U.S. textile producers, seeking additional barriers to
restrict textile imports, brought a countervailing duty action alleging
58. See J. Michael Finger & S. Dhar, Do Rules Control Power? GATTArti-
cles and Agreements in the Uruguay Round, in THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM:
ANALYicAL AND NEGOTIATING ISSUES (Allan W. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern
eds., forthcoming from U. Michigan Press).
59. See M. Dutz, Enforcement of Canadian 'Unfair' Trade Laws, PRE
Working Paper, WPS 776 World Bank (1991) (discussing Canada); G. Banks,
Australia's Antidumping Experience, PRE Working Paper, WPS 551 World
Bank (1990) (discussing Australia).
60. Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of the
United States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GAT 187, 238-39, 248
(Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986) (emphasis added).
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that the Chinese government was subsidizing the export of such prod-
ucts. The legal theory of the complaint was novel and unlikely to be
approved by the courts; it was in fact disapproved by the Commerce
Department in a similar case several months later. In this case, how-
ever, the expected legal response was not allowed to be controlling be-
cause the Executive Branch agreed to use its discretionary powers
under the textile agreements law to achieve an equivalent degree of
trade restriction by other means, by changing a "rules of origin"
requirement. 6
1
Rules of origin are only one of several possible ways to re-
strict imports. GATT itself lists eight categories of forbidden
protectionist measures, and eleven categories of measures per-
mitted in specified circumstances. Such options provide a com-
plete menu for a country seeking alternative means to restrict
imports.6 2
In sum, this section has advanced two points. First, GATT
provisions for antidumping and countervailing duties have
proven to be broad enough to allow an explosion of such actions
in the 1980s. Second, the limits in GATT do not prevent U.S.
government actions. When the politics of an unfair trade case
are compelling, but an affirmative legal determination is not
possible, the United States often can find an alternative legal ba-
sis for restricting trade. Making U.S. antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws consistent with GATT introduces procedural
complications, but it does not severely limit trade-restricting ac-
tions by the U.S. government.
VIII. ECONOMIC NONSENSE
Increasingly, the focus of the unfair trade laws is on protect-
ing any U.S. production that might be displaced by import com-
petition, even if the proposed remedy would have a negative
effect on U.S. production on the whole. This point is sometimes
difficult for economists to accept, but it seems generally ac-
cepted by the legal community. "Under the GATT, under cur-
rent U.S. law and under other countries' antidumping statutes,
dumping is not considered to be criminal or immoral, but rather
a business practice; the remedy, which is only necessary if injury
is caused to a domestic industry, is to force the companies en-
gaged in dumping to raise their prices, usually a net negative
61. This paragraph was included in the 1984 draft of Professor Hudec's
study, but omitted from the published 1986 draft, id. I quote it here with the
permission of the author.
62. John H. Jackson, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 40-43 (1989).
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effect on the country imposing the duty."63
The change in drawback regulations further illustrates
trade remedy law's disregard of issues of broader economy-wide
concern. Prior to 1988, U.S. exporters could draw back, i.e. be
reimbursed for, any antidumping or countervailing duties they
paid on a product that they re-exported or incorporated into a
product that was exported. 64 In the 1988 trade act, Congress ex-
cluded antidumping and countervailing duties from eligibility
for drawback.65 Any U.S. exporter's interest in access to lower-
priced inputs was thus made secondary to the U.S. input pro-
ducer's interest in protection from import competition.
Many of the above reviewed changes in U.S. unfair trade
law demonstrate that its dominant concern is avoiding injury to
U.S. producers, rather than preserving competition in the U.S.
market. For example, cumulation of injury tests over imports of
steel sheets from various sources seems reasonable if the objec-
tive is only to protect the interests of U.S. producers of steel
sheets. Because import competition arising from many sources
is not predatory, it will not leave U.S. users of products such as
steel sheets exposed to exploitation by foreign monopoly sell-
ers.6 Cumulation, in effect, extends the scope of regulation
from what the antitrust laws attempt to isolate as bad competi-
tion to what economic theory would describe as normal competi-
tion. If applied to domestic commerce, cumulation would
require intervention to protect any firm that could not keep up
with its competitors. To believe in the cumulation principle is to
believe that competition normally does not serve society's
interests. 67
63. Horlick & Oliver, supra note 1, at 23 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 42.
65. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 1334(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1209 (1988).
66. Proof of predatory effects or intent is not required in an unfair trade
case. "We . .. should put to rest the media concept that predatory dumping
exists. It may exist, but none of the trade laws require any showing of preda-
tory intent whatsoever." Harvey M. Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Corn.
petition Law and Policy: An Antitrust Perspective, 56 ANITRUST L.J. 409, 412
(1987). "[No less a body than the United States Supreme Court has observed
that 'predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried and [are] even more rarely suc-
cessful.' It probably is safe to predict that in none of the 767 affirmative an-
tidumping determinations reached by Australia, Canada, the EC and the US
between 1980 and 1986 was predatory pricing remotely present." Palmeter, The
Antidumping Emperor, supra note 4, at 6 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)).
67. The fully-allocated-costs pricing standard and cumulation of injury are
only two of many ways in which the unfair trade laws impose much more strin-
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CONCLUSION
It seems clear that the unfair trade laws do not embody any
moral, economic, or philosophical definition of "unfair." Why
should they? None of the political pressures and economic in-
terests that have propelled the laws' passage or molded their en-
forcement would measure their effectiveness by how accurately
these laws approximate such standards.
Antidumping and countervailing duty laws aim to protect
U.S. production threatened by import competition. Unfair trade
procedures neither focus on what foreign sellers do, nor ask
whether what they do is fair or unfair. The legal definitions of
unfairness offer so many possibilities that any U.S. producer
who would be better off if imports were restricted can find a way
to qualify - if not now, then after the next trade bill.
This does not mean that just any briefcase full of informa-
tion from a U.S. industry will be sufficient to win an affirmative
determination. However, a domestic interest stopped by a mere
detail of the law need only prepare a new petition, or wait for a
revision of the administrative regulations or amendment of the
law - as did the Louisiana sulfur company whose problem was
fixed by adding "constructed value" to the law.68
In the long run, a winning portfolio can be pulled together
by any industry that experiences substantive competition from
imports. The cost of putting that portfolio together and the te-
dium of negotiating a voluntary export restraint that will give
the exporters enough extra profit to buy off their sovereign
right to retaliate are the major limits on the protection the sys-
tem provides. Domestic politics impose only the necessity of ex-
plaining that foreigners are unfair, while the trade laws provide
the podium from which to do so.
Almost all of the procedural changes (but not the substan-
tive changes) that have been made are commendable. Standards
are stated with increased precision, objective application is
guarded by court review, and interested parties have the right to
review the evidence and to comment on its accuracy and inter-
pretation. Transparency, openness, and objectivity are impor-
tant parts of the American 'rule of law' ideal. Yet these
procedural refinements seem to contribute more to the problem
than to a solution. The emphasis on doing things the right way
gent limits on what foreign sellers can do in the U.S. market than the U.S.
antitrust laws impose on domestic sellers. See supra text accompanying note 37;
Palmeter, The Antidumping Emperor, supra note 4, at 6-7.
68. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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distracts us from seeing that we are doing the wrong thing. The
unfair trade laws, with their broad definitions of what is unfair,
recall a cynical characterization of American justice: we give
every horse thief a fair trial, then we hang him.
The GATT expresses the best intentions and highest aspira-
tions of international leadership since the end of World War II.
However, its provisions have been proven too general to provide
effective limits on trade restrictions. Robert Hudec's point that
trade restrictions are fungible is important. The limits on au-
thority provided in one section of the law can be evaded by using
the discretion provided in another section.
The unfair trade laws - as Congress has expanded them
and as the president has enforced them - provide protection for
every American industry that faces import competition. An ear-
lier analysis of the expansion of the protective system explains:
One of the great defects of the protective system is that it provides no
clear basis for discrimination, and that, since discrimination is politi-
cally difficult, Congress destroys the essential character of the policy in
order to make it politically strong.6 9
The analyst I am quoting is E.E. Schattschneider (1935), and
the passage comes from his celebrated analysis of the politics of
the Smoot-Hawley tariff. 'The history of the American tariff,"
argues Schattschneider, "is the story of a dubious economic pol-
icy turned into a great political success. '70
There is further parallel between 1930's politics of the tariff
and today's politics of unfair trade. The "principle" behind the
Smoot-Hawley tariff was that it should offset the difference be-
tween the cost of an article outside and inside the United States.
But, as Schattschneider saw things:
[Talk of tariffs written on the costs formula is no more than an elabo-
rate sham and a bluff .... The [congressional] committees did not
generally determine rates according to the formula advertised and they
did not do so for the conclusive reason that they could not.71
mhe difference of costs formula is to be classified more properly as a
slogan belonging to the politics of gaining acceptance of the legislation
than as a method of determining rates. It is an argument rather than a
formula.7
2
U.S. commercial policy has gone full circle. The fairness-
equalization policy of the 1980s enforced through antidumping
and countervailing duty orders is the same as the cost-equaliza-
69. E.E. Schattschneider, PoLIcs, PREssuREs AND THE TARiFF 85 (Archon
Books 1963) (1935).
70. Id. at 283.
71. Id. at 84.
72. Id. at 284.
[Vol. 1:35
THE MEANING OF "UNFAIR"
tion policy of 1930 enforced through the tariff. I do not point out
this parallel to predict that unfair trade regulations will go the
way of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, but to predict that when a new
wind in trade policy thought blows aside the unfair trade rules,
future policy makers will regard the current unfair trade rules
to be as absurd as we now consider the Smoot-Hawley cost-
equalization formula.
HOW DO WE GET TO CINCINNATI?
SOME POLICY ADVICE
What we are doing now is worse than doing nothing at all:
therefore, we should not do it. But how do we change course?
A city slicker, driving through the countryside on his way to
Cincinnati, realized that he had lost his way. He stopped and
asked a farmer, "How do I get to Cincinnati?"
The farmer responded, "Well, you go down the road, take
the second fork to the left. Eventually you'll come to a cross-
roads where you'll see a sign directing you to Wilson's Store. Go
toward Wilson's Store, but before you get there.., now wait a
minute. It might be better if you go up this road, then after you
cross a bridge .... No, I don't believe that will get you there
either. You know, mister, I don't think you can get to Cincinnati
from here."
To this the city slicker responded, "What? You've lived
here all your life and you don't know the way to Cincinnati?
You must be pretty stupid."
The farmer replies, "Maybe so, but I'm not lost."
This old story usually ends here, but in my version the city
slicker has the last word: "That's only because you don't want to
go to Cincinnati. If you knew how much nicer it is in Cincinnati
than it is here, then you'd be lost, too."
Perhaps the United States has never been to Cincinnati, but
it has been closer than it is now. Indeed, the U.S. administration
and Congress of the 1980s might paraphrase Pogo: "We have met
Smoot, Hawley, and Hoover, and they are us."
How do we get to Cincinnati? Perhaps we start by changing
the law so that it explains how nice it is in Cincinnati as well as
how nice it is here. Anyone should be able to petition for an
import restriction, as is now the case. However, trade regulation
should focus on both those who would benefit and those who
would suffer from a proposed trade restriction, and should con-
sider how much will be gained or lost. Because the domestic
economic costs of a trade-restricting action can be as substantial
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as its gain, a domestic entity which is hurt economically by an
impediment to imports should have the same standing in law
and in administrative procedures as someone who profits from
the impediment. This should include the administrative
mechanics to petition for removal of an impediment to imports
when that impediment compromises an entity's economic inter-
ests.73 This is hardly a new notion. The idea that the gains from
free trade are usually greater than the costs has been around
since Adam Smith; it just has never been recognized in U.S. law.
73. J. Michael Finger, Incorporating the Gains from Trade into Policy, 5
THE WORLD ECONOMY 367-77 (1982).
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